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Game theoretic modeling of pilot behavior
during mid-air encounters
Ritchie Lee and David Wolpert
Abstract We show how to combine Bayes nets and game theory to predict the be-
havior of hybrid systems involving both humans and automated components. We
call this novel framework “Semi Network-Form Games,” and illustrate it by pre-
dicting aircraft pilot behavior in potential near mid-air collisions. At present, at the
beginning of such potential collisions, a collision avoidance system in the aircraft
cockpit advises the pilots what to do to avoid the collision. However studies of mid-
air encounters have found wide variability in pilot responses to avoidance system
advisories. In particular, pilots rarely perfectly execute the recommended maneu-
vers, despite the fact that the collision avoidance system’s effectiveness relies on
their doing so. Rather pilots decide their actions based on all information available
to them (advisory, instrument readings, visual observations). We show how to build
this aspect into a semi network-form game model of the encounter and then present
computational simulations of the resultant model.
1 Introduction
Bayes nets have been widely investigated and commonly used to describe stochas-
tic systems [1, 10, 26]. Powerful techniques already exist for the manipulation, in-
ference, and learning of probabilistic networks. Furthermore, these methods have
been well-established in many domains, including expert systems, robotics, speech
recognition, and networking and communications [19]. On the other hand, game
theory is frequently used to describe the behavior of interacting humans [7, 9]. A
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vast amount of experimental literature exists (especially in economic contexts, such
as auctions and negotiations), which analyze and refine human behavior models
[4, 5, 27]. These two fields have traditionally been regarded as orthogonal bodies
of work. However, in this work we propose to create a modeling framework that
leverages the strengths of both.
Building on earlier approaches [2, 20], we introduce a novel framework, “Semi
Network-Form Game,” (or “semi net-form game”) that combines Bayes nets and
game theory to model hybrid systems. We use the term “hybrid systems” to mean
such systems that may involve multiple interacting human and automation compo-
nents. The semi network-form game is a specialization of the complete framework
“network-form game,” formally defined and elaborated in [32].
The issue of aircraft collision avoidance has recently received wide attention
from aviation regulators due to some alarming near mid-air collision (NMAC)
statistics [24]. Many discussions call into question the effectiveness of current sys-
tems, especially that of the onboard collision avoidance system. This system, called
“Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System (TCAS),” is associated with many
weaknesses that render it increasingly less effective as traffic density grows expo-
nentially. Some of these weaknesses include complex contorted advisory logic, ver-
tical only advisories, and unrealistic pilot models. In this work, we demonstrate how
the collision avoidance problem can be modeled using a semi net-form game, and
show how this framework can be used to perform safety and performance analyses.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 2, we start by estab-
lishing the theoretical fundamentals of semi net-form games. First, we give a formal
definition of the semi net-form game. Secondly, we motivate and define a new game
theoretic equilibrium concept called “level-K relaxed strategies” that can be used
to make predictions on a semi net-form game. Motivated by computational issues,
we then present variants of this equilibrium concept that improve both computa-
tional efficiency and prediction variance. In Section 3, we use a semi net-form game
to model the collision avoidance problem and discuss in detail the modeling of a 2-
aircraft mid-air encounter. First, we specify each element of the semi net-form game
model and describe how we compute a sample of the game theoretic equilibrium.
Secondly, we describe how to extend the game across time to simulate a complete
encounter. Then we present the results of a sensitivity analysis on the model and
examine the potential benefits of a horizontal advisory system. Finally, we conclude
via a discussion of semi net-form game benefits in Section 4 and concluding remarks
in Section 5.
2 Semi Network-Form Games
Before we formally define the semi net-form game and various player strategies, we
first define the notation used throughout the chapter.
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2.1 Notation
Our notation is a combination of standard game theory notation and standard Bayes
net notation. The probabilistic simplex over a space Z is written as ∆Z . Any Carte-
sian product ×y∈Y∆Z is written as ∆Z|Y . So ∆Z|Y is the space of all possible condi-
tional distributions of z ∈ Z conditioned on a value y ∈ Y .
We indicate the size of any finite set A as |A|. Given a function g with domain
X and a subset Y ⊂ X , we write g(Y ) to mean the set {g(x) : x ∈ Y}. We couch
the discussion in terms of countable spaces, but much of the discussion carries over
to the uncountable case, e.g., by replacing Kronecker deltas δa,b with Dirac deltas
δ (a−b).
We use uppercase letters to indicate a random variable or its range, with the
context making the choice clear. We use lowercase letters to indicate a particular
element of the associated random variable’s range, i.e., a particular value of that
random variable. When used to indicate a particular player i, we will use the notation
−i to denote all players excluding player i. We will also use primes to indicate
sampled or dummy variables.
2.2 Definition
A semi net-form game uses a Bayes net to serve as the underlying probabilistic
framework, consequently representing all parts of the system using random vari-
ables. Non-human components such as automation and physical systems are de-
scribed using “chance” nodes, while human components are described using “de-
cision” nodes. Formally, chance nodes differ from decision nodes in that their con-
ditional probability distributions are pre-specified. Instead each decision node is
associated with a utility function, which maps an instantiation of the net to a real
number quantifying the player’s utility. To fully specify the Bayes net, it is neces-
sary to determine the conditional distributions at the decision nodes to go with the
distributions at the chance nodes. We will discuss how to arrive at the players’ con-
ditional distributions (over possible actions), also called their “strategies,” later in
Section 2.6. We now formally define a semi network-form game as follows:
Definition 1. An (N-player) semi network-form game is a quintuple (G,X ,u,R,pi)
where
1. G is a finite directed acyclic graph {V,E}, where V is the set of vertices and E is
the set of connecting edges of the graph. We write the set of parent nodes of any
node v ∈V as pa(v) and its successors as succ(v).
2. X is a Cartesian product of |V | separate finite sets, each with at least two ele-
ments, with the set for element v ∈V written as Xv, and the Cartesian product of
sets for all elements in pa(v) written as Xpa(v).
3. u is a function X → RN . We will typically view it as a set of N utility functions
ui : X → R.
4 Ritchie Lee and David Wolpert
4. R is a partition of V into N + 1 subsets the first N of which have exactly one
element. The elements of R(1) through R(N) are called “Decision” nodes, and
the elements of R(N +1) are “Chance” nodes. We write D ≡ ∪Ni=1R(i) and C ≡
R(N+1).
5. pi is a function from v ∈ R(N+1)→ ∆Xv|×v′∈pa(v)Xv′ . (In other words, pi assigns to
every v ∈ R(N+1) a conditional probability distribution of v conditioned on the
values of its parents.)
Intuitively, Xv is the set of all possible states at node v, ui is the utility function of
player i, R(i) is the decision node set by player i, and pi is the fixed set of distributions
at chance nodes. As an example, a normal-form game [22] is a semi net-form game
in which E is empty. As another example, let v be a decision node of player i that has
one parent, v′. Then the conditional distribution P(Xv′ | Xpa(v′)) is a generalization
of an information set.
A semi net-form game is a special case of a general network-form game [32].
In particular, a semi net-form game allows each player to control only one decision
node, whereas the full network-form game makes no such restrictions allowing a
player to control multiple decision nodes in the net. Branching (via “branch nodes”)
is another feature not available in semi net-form games. Like a net-form game,
Multi-Agent Influence Diagrams [20] also allow multiple nodes to be controlled
by each player. Unlike a net-form game, however, they do not consider bounded
rational agents, and have special utility nodes rather than utility functions.
2.3 A Simple Semi Network-Form Game Example
We illustrate the basic understandings of semi net-form games using the sim-
ple example shown in Figure 1. In this example, there are 6 random variables
(A,B,C,D,P1,P2) represented as nodes in the net; the edges between nodes define
the conditional dependence between random variables. For example, the probability
of D depends on the values of P1 and P2, while the probability of A does not depend
on any other variables. We distinguish between the two types of nodes: chance nodes
(A,B,C,D), and decision nodes (P1,P2). As discussed previously, chance nodes dif-
fer from decision nodes in that their conditional probability distributions are speci-
fied a-priori. Decision nodes do not have these distributions pre-specified, but rather
what is pre-specified are the utility functions (U1 and U2) of those players. Using
their utility functions, their strategies P(P1 | B) and P(P2 |C) are computed to com-
plete the Bayes net. This computation requires the consideration of the Bayes net
from each player’s perspective.
Figure 2 illustrates the Bayes net from P1’s perspective. In this view, there are
nodes that are observed (B), there are nodes that are controlled (P1), and there are
nodes that do not fall into any of these categories (A,C,P2,D), but appear in the
player’s utility function. This arises from the fact that in general the player’s utility
function can be a function of any variable in the net. As a result, in order to evaluate
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U2 = F2 (P1,P2,A,B,C,D)U1 = F1 (P1,P2,A,B,C,D)
A
B C
P1 P2
P ( C | A )
P ( B | A )
P ( A )
P ( P2 | C )P ( P1 | B )
D
P ( D | P1, P2 )
Chance Nodes: A, B, C, D
Decision Nodes: P1, P2
Fig. 1 A simple net-form game example: Fixed conditional probabilities are specified for chance
nodes (A,B,C,D), while utility functions are specified for decision nodes (P1,P2). Players try to
maximize their expected utility over the Bayes net.
the expected value of his utility function for a particular candidate action (sometimes
we will use the equivalent game theoretic term “move”), P1 must perform inference
over these variables based on what he observes1. Finally, the player chooses the
action that gives the highest expected utility.
2.4 Level-K Thinking
Level-K thinking is a game theoretic equilibrium concept used to predict the out-
come of human-human interactions. A number of studies [2, 3, 4, 6, 8, 33] have
shown promising results predicting experimental data in games using this method.
The concept of level-K is defined recursively as follows. A level K player plays
(picks his action) as though all other players are playing at level K − 1, who, in
turn, play as though all other players are playing at level K− 2, etc. The process
continues until level 0 is reached, where the player plays according to a prespecified
prior distribution. Notice that running this process for a player at K ≥ 2 results in
ricocheting between players. For example, if player A is a level 2 player, he plays
as though player B is a level 1 player, who in turn plays as though player A is a
1 We discuss the computational complexity of a particular equilibrium concept later in Sec-
tion 2.7.1.
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A
B C
P1 P2
D
Observe
Control
Infer 
(estimate)
U1 = F1 (P1,P2,A,B,C,D)
Chance Nodes: A, B, C, D
Decision Nodes: P1, P2
Fig. 2 A simple net-form example game from player 1’s perspective: Using information that he
observes, the player infers over unobserved variables in the Bayes net in order to set the value of
his decision node.
level 0 player. Note that player B in this example may not be a level 1 player in
reality – only that player A assumes him to be during his reasoning process. Since
this ricocheting process between levels takes place entirely in the player’s mind, no
wall clock time is counted (we do not consider the time it takes for a human to run
through his reasoning process). We do not claim that humans actually think in this
manner, but rather that this process serves as a good model for predicting the out-
come of interactions at the aggregate level. In most games, K is a fairly low number
for humans; experimental studies [4] have found K to be somewhere between 1 and
2.
Although this work uses level-K exclusively, we are by no means wedded to this
equilibrium concept. In fact, semi net-form games can be adapted to use other mod-
els, such as Nash equilibrium, Quantal Response Equilibrium, Quantal Level-K, and
Cognitive Hierarchy. Studies [4, 33] have found that performance of an equilibrium
concept varies a fair amount depending on the game. Thus it may be wise to use
different equilibrium concepts for different problems.
2.5 Satisficing
Bounded rationality as coined by Simon [28] stems from observing the limitations
of humans during the decision-making process. That is, humans are limited by the
information they have, cognitive limitations of their minds, and the finite amount
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of time they have to make decisions. The notion of satisficing [5, 28, 29] states
that humans are unable to evaluate the probability of all outcomes with sufficient
precision, and thus often make decisions based on adequacy rather than by finding
the true optimum. Because decision-makers lack the ability and resources to arrive
at the optimal solution, they instead apply their reasoning only after having greatly
simplified the choices available.
Studies have shown evidence of satisficing in human decision-making. In recent
experiments [5], subjects were given a series of calculations (additions and subtrac-
tions), and were told that they will be given a monetary prize equal to the answer
of the calculation that they choose. Although the calculations were not difficult in
nature, they did take effort to perform. The study found that most subjects did not
exhaustively perform all the calculations, but instead stopped when a “high enough”
reward was found.
2.6 Level-K Relaxed Strategies
We use the notions of level-K thinking and satisficing to motivate a new game the-
oretic equilibrium concept called “level-K relaxed strategies.” For a player i to per-
form classic level-K reasoning [4] requires i to calculate best responses2. In turn,
calculating best responses often involves calculating the Bayesian posterior proba-
bility of what information is available to the other players, −i, conditioned on the
information available to i. That posterior is an integral, which typically cannot be
evaluated in closed form.
In light of this, to use level-K reasoning, players must approximate those Bayesian
integrals. We hypothesize that real-world players do this using Monte Carlo sam-
pling. Or more precisely, we hypothesize that their behavior is consistent with their
approximating the integrals that way.
More concretely, given a node v, to form their best-response, the associated
player i = R−1(v) will want to calculate quantities of the form argmaxxv [E(ui |
xv,xpa(v))], where ui is the player’s utility, xv is the variable set by the player (i.e. his
move), and xpa(v) is the realization of his parents that he observes. We hypothesize
that he (behaves as though he) approximates this calculation in several steps. First,
M candidate moves are chosen via IID sampling the player’s satisficing distribution.
Now, for each candidate move, he must estimate the expected utility resulting from
playing that move. He does this by sampling the posterior probability distribution
PK(XV | xv,xpa(v)) (which accounts for what he knows), and computing the sample
expectation uˆKi . Finally, he picks the move that has the highest estimated expected
utility. Formally, we give the following definition:
2 We use the term best response in the game theoretic sense. i.e. the player chooses the move with
the highest expected utility.
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Definition 2. Consider a semi network-form game (G,X ,u,R,pi) with level K− 1
relaxed strategies3 ΛK−1(Xv′ | Xpa(v′)) defined for all v′ ∈D and K ≥ 1. For all nodes
v and sets of nodes Z in such a semi net-form game, define
1. U =V \{v, pa(v)},
2. PK(Xv | Xpa(v)) = pi(Xv | Xpa(v)) if v ∈ C,
3. PK(Xv | Xpa(v)) =ΛK−1(Xv | Xpa(v)) if v ∈ D, and
4. PK(XZ) =∏v′′∈Z PK(Xv′′ | Xpa(v′′)).
Definition 3. Consider a semi network-form game (G,X ,u,R,pi). For all v ∈ D,
specify an associated level 0 distribution Λ 0(Xv | xpa(v)) ∈ ∆Xv|×v′∈pa(v)Xv′ and an as-
sociated satisficing distribution λ (Xv | xpa(v)) ∈ ∆Xv|×v′∈pa(v)Xv′ . Also specify count-
ing numbers M and M′.
For any K ≥ 1, the level K relaxed strategy of node v ∈D is the conditional dis-
tributionΛK(Xv | xpa(v))∈ ∆Xv|×v′∈pa(v)Xv′ sampled by running the following stochas-
tic process independently for each xpa(v) ∈ Xpa(v):
1. Form a set {x′v( j) : j= 1, . . . ,M} of IID samples of λ (Xv | xpa(v)) and then remove
all duplicates. Let m be the resultant size of the set;
2. For j = 1, . . . ,m, form a set {x′V (k;x′v( j)) : k = 1, . . .M′} of IID samples of the
joint distribution
PK(XV | x′v( j),xpa(v)) = ∏
v′∈V
PK(Xv′ | Xpa(v′))δXpa(v),xpa(v)δXv,x′v( j);
and compute
uˆKi (x
′
U (;x
′
v( j)),x
′
v( j),xpa(v)) =
1
M′
M′
∑
k=1
ui(x′V (k,x
′
v( j)));
where x′V (;x′v( j)) is shorthand for {x′v′(k,x′v( j)) : v′ ∈V,k = 1, . . . ,M′}
3. Return x′v( j∗) where j∗ ≡ argmax j[uˆKi (x′U (;x′v( j)),x′v( j),xpa(v))].
Intuitively, the counting numbers M and M′ can be interpreted as a measure of
a player’s rationality. Take, for example, M → ∞ and M′ → ∞. Then the player’s
entire movespace would be considered as candidate moves, and the expected utility
of each candidate move would be perfectly evaluated. Under these circumstances,
the player will always choose the best possible move, making him perfectly rational.
On the other hand if M = 1, this results in the player choosing his move according
to his satisficing distribution, corresponding to random behavior.
One of the strengths of Monte Carlo expectation estimation is that it is unbiased
[25]. This property carries over to level-K relaxed strategies. More precisely, con-
sider a level K relaxed player i, deciding which of his moves {x′v( j) : j ∈ 1, . . . ,m}
to play for the node v he controls, given a particular set of values xpa(v) that he
3 We will define level-K relaxed strategies in Definition 3.
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observes. To do this he will compare the values uˆKi (x
′
U (;x
′
v( j)),x
′
v( j),xpa(v)). These
values are all unbiased estimates of the associated conditional expected utility4 eval-
uated under an equivalent Bayes Net Γi defined in Theorem 1. Formally, we have the
following:
Theorem 1. Consider a semi net-form game (G,X ,u,R,pi) with associated satisfic-
ing λ (Xv | xpa(v)) and level 0 distribution Λ 0(Xv | xpa(v)) specified for all players.
Choose a particular player i of that game, a particular level K, and a player
move xv = x′v( j) from Definition 3 for some particular j. Consider any values xpa(v)
where v is the node controlled by player i. Define Γi as any Bayes net whose directed
acyclic graph is G, where for all nodes v′ ∈C, PΓi(Xv′ | Xpa(v′)) = pi(Xv′ | Xpa(v′)), for
all nodes v′′ ∈D, PΓi(Xv′′ | Xpa(v′′)), and where PΓi(Xv | Xpa(v)) is arbitrary so long as
PΓi(xv | xpa(v)) 6= 0. We also define the notation PΓi(XZ) for a set Z of nodes to mean
∏v′∈Z PΓi(Xv′ | Xpa(v′)).
Then the expected value E(uˆKi | x′v( j),xpa(v)) evaluated under the associated
level-K relaxed strategy equals E(ui | xv,xpa(v)) evaluated under the Bayes net Γi.
Proof. Write
E(uˆKi | x′v( j),xpa(v)) =∫
dx′V (;x
′
v( j)) P(x
′
V (;x
′
v( j)) | x′v( j),xpa(v))uˆKi (x′V (;x′v( j)))
=
∫
dx′V (;x
′
v( j)) P(x
′
V (;x
′
v( j)) | x′v( j),xpa(v))
1
M′
M′
∑
k=1
ui(x′V (k,x
′
v( j)))
=
1
M′
M′
∑
k=1
∫
dx′V (k,x
′
v( j)) P
K(x′V (k,x
′
v( j)) | x′v( j),xpa(v))ui(x′V (k,x′v( j)))
=
1
M′
M′
∑
k=1
∫
dXV PK(XV | xv,xpa(v))ui(XU ,xv,xpa(v))
=
∫
dXV PK(XV | xv,xpa(v))ui(XU ,xv,xpa(v))
=
∫
dXU PK(XU ,xv,xpa(v))ui(XU ,xv,xpa(v))∫
dXU PK(XU ,xv,xpa(v))
=
∫
dXU ∏v′∈U PK(Xv′ | Xpa(v′))∏v′′∈pa(v)PK(xv′′ | Xpa(v′′))PK(xv | xpa(v))ui(XU ,xv,xpa(v))∫
dXU ∏z′∈U PK(Xz′ | Xpa(z′))∏z′′∈pa(v)PK(xz′′ | Xpa(z′′))PK(xv | xpa(v))
=
∫
dXU ∏v′∈U PK(Xv′ | Xpa(v′))∏v′′∈pa(v)PK(xv′′ | Xpa(v′′))ui(XU ,xv,xpa(v))∫
dXU ∏z′∈U PK(Xz′ | Xpa(z′))∏z′′∈pa(v)PK(xz′′ | Xpa(z′′))
=
∫
dXU ∏v′∈U PΓi(Xv′ | Xpa(v′))∏v′′∈pa(v)PΓi(xv′′ | Xpa(v′′))ui(XU ,xv,xpa(v))∫
dXU ∏z′∈U PΓi(Xz′ | Xpa(z′))∏z′′∈pa(v)PΓi(xz′′ | Xpa(z′′))
4 Note that the true expected conditional utility is not defined without an associated complete Bayes
net. However, we show in Theorem 1 Proof that the expected conditional utility is actually inde-
pendent of the probability PΓi (Xv | Xpa(v)) and so it can chosen arbitrarily. We make the assumption
that PΓi (xv | xpa(v)) 6= 0 for mathematical formality to avoid dividing by zero in the proof.
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=
∫
dXV PΓi(XV | xv,xpa(v))ui(XU ,xv,xpa(v))
= E(ui | xv,xpa(v)) uunionsq
In other words, we can set PK(xv | xpa(v)) arbitrarily (as long as it is nonzero)
and still have the utility estimate evaluated under the associated level-K relaxed
strategy be an unbiased estimate of the expected utility conditioned on xv and xpa(v)
evaluated under Γi. Unbiasness in level-K relaxed strategies is important because the
player must rely on a limited number of samples to estimate the expected utility of
each candidate move. The difference of two unbiased estimates is itself unbiased,
enabling the player to compare estimates of expected utility without bias.
2.7 Level-K d-Relaxed Strategies
A practical problem with relaxed strategies is that the number of samples may grow
very quickly with depth of the Bayes net. The following example illustrates another
problem:
Example 1. Consider a net form game with two simultaneously moving players, Bob
and Nature, both making R-valued moves. Bob’s utility function is given by the
difference between his and Nature’s move.
So to determine his level 1 relaxed strategy, Bob chooses M candidate moves by
sampling his satisficing distribution, and then Nature chooses M′ (“level 0”) moves
for each of those M moves by Bob. In truth, one of Bob’s M candidate moves, x∗Bob,
is dominant5 over the other M−1 candidate moves due to the definition of the utility
function. However since there are an independent set of M′ samples of Nature for
each of Bob’s moves, there is nonzero probability that Bob won’t return x∗Bob, i.e.,
his level 1 relaxed strategy has nonzero probability of returning some other move.
As it turns out, a slight modification to the Monte Carlo process defining relaxed
strategies results in Bob returning x∗Bob with probability 1 in Example 1 for many
graphs G. This modification also reduces the explosion in the number of Monte
Carlo samples required for computing the players’ strategies.
This modified version of relaxed strategies works by setting aside a set Y of
nodes which are statistically independent of the state of v. Nodes in Y do not have
to be resampled for each value xv. Formally, the set Y will be defined using the
dependence-separation (d-separation) property concerning the groups of nodes in
the graph G that defines the semi net-form game [19, 20, 23]. Accordingly, we call
this modification “d-relaxed strategies.” Indeed, by not doing any such resampling,
we can exploit the “common random numbers” technique to improve the Monte
Carlo estimates [25]. Loosely speaking, to choose the move with the highest es-
timate of expected utility requires one to compare all pairs of estimates and thus
5 We use the term dominant in the game theoretic sense. i.e., the move x∗Bob gives Bob the highest
expected utility no matter what move Nature makes.
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implicitly evaluate their differences. Recall that the variance of a difference of two
estimates is given by Var(χ − υ) = Var(χ) +Var(υ)− 2Cov(χ,υ). By using d-
relaxed strategies, we expect the covariance Cov(χ,υ) to be positive, reducing the
overall variance in the choice of the best move.
Definition 4. Consider a semi network-form game (G,X ,u,R,pi) with level K− 1
d-relaxed strategies6 Λ¯K−1(Xv′ | Xpa(v′)) defined for all v′ ∈ D and K ≥ 1. For all
nodes v and sets of nodes Z in such a semi net-form game, define
1. Sv = succ(v),
2. S−v =V \{v∪Sv},
3. Y =V \{v∪ pa(v)∪Sv},
4. P¯K(Xv | Xpa(v)) = pi(Xv | Xpa(v)) if v ∈ C,
5. P¯K(Xv | Xpa(v)) = Λ¯K−1(Xv | Xpa(v)) if v ∈ D, and
6. P¯K(XZ) =∏v′′∈Z P¯K(Xv′′ | Xpa(v′′)).
Note that Y ∪ pa(v) = S−v and v∪ Sv ∪ S−v = V . The motivation for these defi-
nitions comes from the fact that Y is precisely the set of nodes that are d-separated
from v by pa(v). As a result, when the player who controls v samples Xv conditioned
on the observed xpa(v), the resultant value xv is statistically independent of the values
of all the nodes in Y . Therefore the same set of samples of the values of the nodes
in Y can be reused for each new sample of Xv. This kind of reuse can provide sub-
stantial computational savings in the reasoning process of the player who controls
v. We now consider the modified sampling process noting that a level-K d-relaxed
strategy is defined recursively in K, via the sampling of P¯K . Note that in general,
Definition 3 and Definition 5 do not lead to the same player strategies (conditional
distributions) as seen in Example 1.
Definition 5. Consider a semi network-form game (G,X ,u,R,pi) with associated
level 0 distributions Λ 0(Xv | xpa(v)) and satisficing distributions λ (Xv | xpa(v)). Also
specify counting numbers M and M′.
For any K ≥ 1, the level K d-relaxed strategy of node v ∈ D, where v is con-
trolled by player i, is the conditional distribution Λ¯K(Xv | xpa(v)) ∈ ∆Xv|×v′∈pa(v)Xv′
that is sampled by running the following stochastic process independently for each
xpa(v) ∈ Xpa(v):
1. Form a set {x′v( j) : j= 1, . . . ,M} of IID samples of λ (Xv | xpa(v)) and then remove
all duplicates. Let m be the resultant size of the set;
2. Form a set {x′S−v(k) : k = 1, . . . ,M′} of IID samples of the distribution over XS−v
given by
P¯K(XS−v | xpa(v)) = ∏
v′∈S−v
P¯K(Xv′ | Xpa(v′))δXpa(v),xpa(v) ;
6 We will define level-K d-relaxed strategies in Definition 5.
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3. For j = 1, . . . ,m, form a set {x′Sv(k,x′v( j)) : k = 1, . . . ,M′} of IID samples of the
distribution over XSv given by
P¯K(XSv | x′Y (;),x′v( j),xpa(v)) = ∏
v′∈Sv
P¯K(Xv′ | Xpa(v′)) ∏
v′′∈S−v
δXv′′ ,x′v′′ (k)δXv,x′v( j);
and compute
u¯Ki (x
′
Y (;),x
′
Sv(;x
′
v( j)),x
′
v( j),xpa(v)) =
1
M′
M′
∑
k=1
ui(x′Y (k),x
′
Sv(k,x
′
v( j)),x
′
v( j),xpa(v));
where x′Y (;) is shorthand for {x′v(k) : v∈Y,k= 1, . . . ,M′} and x′Sv(;x′v( j)) is short-
hand for {x′Sv(k,x′v( j)) : k = 1, . . . ,M′}.
4. Return x′v( j∗) where j∗ ≡ argmax j[u¯Ki (x′Y (;),x′Sv(;x′v( j)),x′v( j),xpa(v))].
Definition 5 requires directly sampling from a conditional probability, which re-
quires rejection sampling. This is highly inefficient if pa(v) has low probability, and
actually impossible if pa(v) is continuous. For these computational considerations,
we introduce a variation of the previous algorithm based on likelihood-weighted
sampling rather than rejection sampling. Although the procedure, as we shall see in
Definition 7, is only able to estimate the player’s expected utility up to a proportion-
ality constant (due to the use of likelihood-weighted sampling [19]), we point out
that this is sufficient since proportionality is all that is required to choose between
candidate moves. Note that un-normalized likelihood-weighted level-K d-relaxed
strategy, like level-K d-relaxed strategy, is defined recursively in K.
Definition 6. Consider a semi network-form game (G,X ,u,R,pi)with unnormalized
likelihood-weighted level K−1 d-relaxed strategies7 Λ˜K−1(Xv′ | Xpa(v′)) defined for
all v′ ∈ D and K ≥ 1. For all nodes v and sets of nodes Z in such a semi net-form
game, define
1. P˜K(Xv | Xpa(v)) = pi(Xv | Xpa(v)) if v ∈ C,
2. P˜K(Xv | Xpa(v)) = Λ˜K−1(Xv | Xpa(v)) if v ∈ D, and
3. P˜K(XZ) =∏v′′∈Z P˜K(Xv′′ | Xpa(v′′)).
Definition 7. Consider a semi network-form game (G,X ,u,R,pi) with associated
level 0 distributions Λ 0(Xv | xpa(v)) and satisficing distributions λ (Xv | xpa(v)). Also
specify counting numbers M and M′, and recall the meaning of set Y from Defini-
tion 4.
For any K≥ 1, the un-normalized likelihood-weighted level K d-relaxed strat-
egy of node v, where node v is controlled by player i, is the conditional distribution
Λ˜K(Xv | xpa(v)) ∈ ∆Xv|×v′∈pa(v)Xv′ that is sampled by running the following stochastic
process independently for each xpa(v) ∈ Xpa(v):
7 We will define unnormalized likelihood-weighted level-K d-relaxed strategies in Definition 7.
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1. Form a set {x′v( j) : j = 1, . . . ,M} of IID samples of λ (Xv | xpa(v)), and then re-
move all duplicates. Let m be the resultant size of the set;
2. Form a set of weight-sample pairs {(w′(k),x′S−v(k)) : k = 1, . . .M′} by setting
x′pa(v) = xpa(v), IID sampling the distribution over XY given by
P˜K(XY ) = ∏
v′∈Y
P˜K(Xv′ | Xpa(v′))
and setting
w′(k) = ∏
v′∈pa(v)
P˜K(xv′ | x′pa(v′)(k));
3. For j = 1, . . . ,m, form a set {x′Sv(k,x′v( j)) : k = 1, . . .M′} of IID samples of the
distribution over XSv given by
P˜K(XSv | x′Y (;),x′v( j),xpa(v)) = ∏
v′∈Sv
P˜K(Xv′ | Xpa(v′)) ∏
v′′∈S−v
δXv′′ ,x′v′′ (k)δXv,x′v( j);
and compute
u˜i(x′Y (;),x
′
Sv(;x
′
v( j)),x
′
v( j),xpa(v)) =
1
M′
M′
∑
k=1
w′(k)ui(x′Y (k),x
′
Sv(k,x
′
v( j)),x
′
v( j),xpa(v));
4. Return x′v( j∗) where j∗ ≡ argmax j[u˜i(x′Y (k),x′Sv(k,x′v( j)),x′v( j),xpa(v))].
2.7.1 Computational Complexity
Let N be the number of players. Intuitively, as each level K player samples the Bayes
net from their perspective, they initiate samples by all other players at level K− 1.
These players, in turn, initiate samples by all other players at level K−2, continuing
until level 1 is reached (since level 0 players do not sample the Bayes net).
As an example, Figure 3 enumerates the number of Bayes net samples required
to perform level-K d-relaxed sampling for N = 3 where all players reason at K = 3.
Each square represents performing the Bayes net sampling process once. As shown
in the figure, the sampling process of PA at level 3 initiates sampling processes in the
two other players, PB and PC, at level 2. This cascading effect continues until level
1 is reached, and is repeated from the top for PB and PC at level 3. In general, when
all players play at the same level K, this may be conceptualized as having N trees
of degree N−1 and depth K; therefore having a computational complexity propor-
tional to ∑K−1j=0 (N−1) jN, or O(NK). In other words, the computational complexity
is polynomial in the number of players and exponential in the number of levels.
Fortunately, experiments [4, 6] have found K to be small in human reasoning.
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Fig. 3 Computational complexity of level-K d-relaxed strategies with N = 3 and K = 3: Each
box represents a single execution of the algorithm. The computational complexity is found to be
O(NK).
3 Using Semi Net-Form Games to Model Mid-Air Encounters
TCAS is an aircraft collision avoidance system currently mandated by the Interna-
tional Civil Aviation Organization to be fitted to all aircraft with a maximum take-off
mass of over 5700 kg (12,586 lbs) or authorized to carry more than 19 passengers.
It is an onboard system designed to operate independently of ground-based air traf-
fic management systems to serve as the last layer of safety in the prevention of
mid-air collisions. TCAS continuously monitors the airspace around an aircraft and
warns pilots of nearby traffic. If a potential threat is detected, the system will issue
a Resolution Advisory (RA), i.e., recommended escape maneuver, to the pilot. The
RA is presented to the pilot in both a visual and audible form. Depending on the
aircraft, visual cues are typically implemented on either an instantaneous vertical
speed indicator, a vertical speed tape that is part of a primary flight display, or us-
ing pitch cues displayed on the primary flight display. Audibly, commands such as
“Climb, Climb!” or “Descend, Descend!” are heard.
If both (own and intruder) aircraft are TCAS-equipped, the issued RAs are co-
ordinated, i.e., the system will recommend different directions to the two aircraft.
This is accomplished via the exchange of “intents” (coordination messages). How-
ever, not all aircraft in the airspace are TCAS-equipped, i.e., general aviation. Those
that are not equipped cannot issue RAs.
While TCAS has performed satisfactorily in the past, there are many limitations
to the current TCAS system. First, since TCAS input data is very noisy in the hor-
izontal direction, issued RAs are in the vertical direction only, greatly limiting the
solution space. Secondly, TCAS is composed of many complex deterministic rules,
rendering it difficult for authorities responsible for the maintenance of the sys-
tem (i.e., Federal Aviation Administration) to understand, maintain, and upgrade.
Thirdly, TCAS assumes straight-line aircraft trajectories and does not take into ac-
count flight plan information. This leads to a high false-positive rate, especially in
the context of closely-spaced parallel approaches.
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This work focuses on addressing one major weakness of TCAS: the design as-
sumption of a deterministic pilot model. Specifically, TCAS assumes that a pilot
receiving an RA will delay for 5 seconds, and then accelerate at 1/4 g to execute
the RA maneuver precisely. Although pilots are trained to obey in this manner, a
recent study of the Boston area [21] has found that only 13% of RAs are obeyed –
the aircraft response maneuver met the TCAS design assumptions in vertical speed
and promptness. In 64% of the cases, pilots were in partial compliance – the aircraft
moved in the correct direction, but did not move as promptly or as aggressively as
instructed. Shockingly, the study found that in 23% of RAs, the pilots actually re-
sponded by maneuvering the aircraft in the opposite direction of that recommended
by TCAS (a number of these cases of non-compliance may be attributed to visual
flight rules8). As air traffic density is expected to double in the next 30 years [13],
the safety risks of using such a system will increase dramatically.
Pilot interviews have offered many insights toward understanding these statis-
tics. The main problem is a mismatch between the pilot model used to design the
TCAS system and the behavior exhibited by real human pilots. During a mid-air en-
counter, the pilot does not blindly execute the RA maneuver. Instead, he combines
the RA with other sources of information (i.e., instrument panel, visual observation)
to judge his best course of action. In doing this, he quantifies the quality of a course
of action in terms of a utility function, or degree of happiness, defined over possible
results of that course of action. That utility function does not only involve proximity
to the other aircraft in the encounter, but also involves how drastic a maneuver the
pilot makes. For example, if the pilot believes that a collision is unlikely based on
his observations, he may opt to ignore the alarm and continue on his current course,
thereby avoiding any loss of utility incurred by maneuvering. This is why a pilot
will rationally decide to ignore alarms with a high probability of being false.
When designing TCAS, a high false alarm rate need not be bad in and of it-
self. Rather what is bad is a high false alarm rate combined with a pilot’s utility
function to result in pilot behavior which is undesirable at the system level. This
more nuanced perspective allows far more powerful and flexible design of alarm
systems than simply worrying about the false positive rate. Here, this perspective
is elaborated. We use a semi net-form game for predicting the behavior of a sys-
tem comprising automation and humans who are motivated by utility functions and
anticipation of one another’s behavior.
Recall the definition of a semi net-form game via a quintuple (G,X ,u,R,pi) in
Definition 1. We begin by specifying each component of this quintuple. To increase
readability, sometimes we will use (and mix) the equivalent notation Z = XZ , z= xZ ,
and z′ = x′Z for a node Z throughout the TCAS modeling.
8 Visual flight rules are a set of regulations set forth by the Federal Aviation Administration which
allow a pilot to operate an aircraft relying on visual observations (rather than cockpit instruments).
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3.1 Directed Acyclic Graph G
The directed acyclic graph G for a 2-aircraft encounter is shown in Figure 4. At any
time t, the true system state of the mid-air encounter is represented by the world
state S, which includes the states of all aircraft. Since the pilots (the players in this
model) and TCAS hardware are not able to observe the world state perfectly, a layer
of nodes is introduced to model observational noise and incomplete information.
The variable Wi represents pilot i’s observation of the world state, while WTCASi
represents the observations of TCAS i’s sensors. A simplified model of the current
TCAS logic is then applied to WTCASi to emulate an RA Ti. Each pilot uses his own
observations Wi and Ti to choose an aircraft maneuver command Ai. Finally, we
produce the outcome H by simulating the aircraft states forward in time using a
model of aircraft kinematics, and calculate the social welfare F . We will describe
the details of these variables in the following sections.
Pilot 2 P2
P2's action A2
World State S
TCAS1's 
Observations 
WTCAS1
P2’s Observations 
W2
P1’s 
Observations W1
TCAS1's 
RA T1
TCAS2's 
RA T2
TCAS2's 
Observations 
WTCAS2
The TCAS 
algorithm 
being 
evaluated
The 
algorithm for 
calculating 
player’s 
strategies
The 
algorithm for 
simulating 
aircraft 
kinematics Outcome H
Pilot 1 P1
P1's action A1
Social 
Welfare F
Fig. 4 Bayes net diagram of a 2-aircraft mid-air encounter: Each pilot chooses a vertical rate to
maximize his expected utility based on his TCAS alert and a noisy partial observation of the world
state.
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3.2 Variable Spaces X
3.2.1 Space of World State S
The world state S contains all the states used to define the mid-air encounter environ-
ment. It includes 10 states per aircraft to represent kinematics and pilot commands
(see Table 1) and 2 states per aircraft to indicate TCAS intent. Recall that TCAS has
coordination functionality, where it broadcasts its intents to other aircraft to avoid
issuing conflicting RAs. The TCAS intent variables are used to remember whether
an aircraft has previously issued an RA, and if so, what was the sense (direction).
Table 1 A description of aircraft kinematic states and pilot inputs.
Variable Units Description
x ft Aircraft position in x direction
y ft Aircraft position in y direction
z ft Aircraft position in z direction
θ rad Heading angle
θ˙ rad/s Heading angle rate
z˙ ft/s Aircraft vertical speed
f ft/s Aircraft forward speed
φc rad Commanded aircraft roll angle
z˙c ft/s Commanded aircraft vertical speed
fc ft/s Commanded aircraft forward speed
3.2.2 Space of TCAS Observation WTCASi
Being a physical system, TCAS does not have full and direct access to the world
state. Rather, it must rely on noisy partial observations of the world to make its
decisions. WTCASi captures these observational imperfections, modeling TCAS sen-
sor noise and limitations. Note that each aircraft has its own TCAS hardware and
makes its own observations of the world. Consequently, observations are made from
a particular aircraft’s perspective. To be precise, we denote WTCASi to represent the
observations that TCAS i makes of the world state, where TCAS i is the TCAS
system on board aircraft i. Table 2 describes each variable in WTCASi . Variables are
real-valued (or positively real-valued where the negative values do not have physical
meaning).
3.2.3 Space of TCAS RA Ti
A simplified version of TCAS, called mini TCAS, is implemented based on [16]
with minor modifications (we will discuss the differences in Section 3.5.3). Mini
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Table 2 A description of WTCASi variables.
Variable Unit Description
rh ft Horizontal range between own and intruding aircraft
r˙h ft/s Horizontal range rate
h˙ ft/s Relative vertical rate between own and intruding aircraft
h ft Relative altitude between own and intruding aircraft
hi ft Own aircraft’s altitude
TCAS issues an RA Ti based on WTCASi input, emulating the TCAS logic. The
variable Ti represents the recommended target vertical rate issued to pilot i. We
model Ti as able to take on one of 6 possible values: no RA issued, descend
at 42 ft/s, descend at 25 ft/s, level-off, climb at 25 ft/s, or climb at 42 ft/s. i.e.,
Ti ∈ { /0,−42,−25,0,25,42}, where Ti = /0 indicates no RA issued, otherwise Ti is
specified in ft/s.
3.2.4 Space of Pilot’s Observation Wi
Aside from the RA, pilots have other sources of information about the world, such
as those coming from instruments and visual observations. All paths of informa-
tion are considered when the pilot decides his best course of action. Unfortunately,
instruments and visuals also provide noisy partial observations of the world state.
Properly speaking there are many intricacies that should be considered in the pi-
lot observation model. First, the model should reflect the type and amount of infor-
mation available via the cockpit instruments. Secondly, the model should reasonably
approximate the visual observation characteristics and its limitations, such as field
of view and geometry. For example, visual accuracy should decrease as distance
increases, and moreover, visual observations of the intruding aircraft cannot be ac-
quired altogether if the intruding aircraft is situated behind own aircraft. Lastly, the
model should consider a pilot attention model, since pilots may miss detecting an
intruding aircraft if they are preoccupied with other tasks. Attention and situational
awareness are large topics of research in psychology and human factors especially
under the context of pilots and military personnel [11, 12, 30, 31].
As a first step, we do not consider the above subtleties, and begin with a very
crude model for the pilot’s observations. In particular, we model the pilot’s obser-
vation Wi as being a corrupted version of S.
3.2.5 Space of Pilot’s Move Ai and Outcome H
At his decision point, pilot i observes his parent nodes and takes an action (i.e, sets
the value of node Ai). The variable Ai is the target vertical rate for aircraft i repre-
sented by a real-valued number between -50 and 50 ft/s. We take the outcome H as
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being in the same space as S. We will later see how this facilitates the simulation of
the encounter.
3.3 Utility Function u
The pilot’s utility function summarizes in a real number the degree of happiness for
a given joint outcome. It is a simple parameterization of the player that characterizes
him and summarizes his preferences. Players act to maximize his expected utility.
In this modeling, we assume all pilots have the same utility function.
Properly speaking, the utility function should be learned from data to be as re-
alistic as possible. However, since the task of learning parameters from data is a
significant research topic of its own, it is being pursued as a separate effort. For
now, the utility functions are crafted using intuition gained from pilot interviews.
The authors found that pilots considered primarily 3 priorities when deciding how
to react to a TCAS RA.
1. Avoid collision. Pilots will do all that is necessary to avoid a collision, thus this
has the highest priority. Since the fear of a collision increases as the aircraft get
closer, a representative metric for measuring this impetus for collision avoidance
is the minimum approach distance between aircraft dmin (i.e., the smallest sepa-
ration distance between two aircraft over the entire encounter).
2. Course deviation. There are many reasons why a pilot does not want to deviate
from his current course. For example, deviations are often associated with longer
flight times, higher fuel consumption, and increased flying effort. The notion is
that if a collision is deemed unlikely (i.e., there’s a high chance of TCAS being
a false positive), then the pilot will be inclined to stay on his current course. We
reflect this inclination by penalizing the difference between the current vertical
speed and the vertical speed in consideration.
3. Obeying TCAS. Pilots have indicated that when they feel uncertain that they
will be inclined to follow TCAS. In other words, given all else equal, pilots have
a natural tendency to follow RAs. This may be attributed to their training, their
inclination to follow orders, or even blind trust in the system. We summarize this
tendency into a metric by penalizing moves that deviate from the issued RA.
In summary, utility function is chosen to be of the following form:
ui = α1 log(δ +dmin)−α2|z˙−ai|−α3|Ti−ai|
where α1, α2, and α3 are real positive constant weights, δ is a small positive con-
stant, ai is the pilot’s action, dmin is the minimum approach distance between the
aircraft, and z˙ is the aircraft’s current vertical speed. The weights reflect how the pi-
lot trades off the three competing objectives. The weight α1 is largest, since avoiding
collision is highest priority; α2 is the second largest, followed by α3 with the small-
est weight. The log function in the first term is used to capture the fact that the rate
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of utility increase/decrease is much faster when the aircraft are close together than
when they are far apart.
3.4 Partition R
We partition the variables in the net into chance and decision nodes as follows:
The nodes in the set {S,WTCAS1 ,WTCAS2 ,T1,T2,W1,W2,H} are chance nodes, and
the nodes A1 and A2 are decision nodes. Moreover, player 1 sets the value of the
node A1, and player 2 sets the value of the node A2.
3.5 Set of Conditional Probabilities pi
In this section, we describe the conditional probability distribution associated with
each chance node. Note the use of stochastic terminology such as “sample” and
“conditional probability distribution” for both stochastic and deterministic nodes.
This is in light that we may view a deterministic node as stochastic with all its
probability mass on its deterministic result.
3.5.1 CPD of the World State S
At the beginning of an encounter, the world state is initialized using the encounter
generator (to be discussed in Section 3.7.3). Otherwise, the outcome H at time t−∆ t
becomes the world state S at time t.
3.5.2 CPD of TCAS Observation WTCASi
To calculate WTCASi , the exact versions of the variables in Table 2 are first calculated
from the world state S using the following equations:
rh =
√
(x j− xi)2+(y j− yi)2
r˙h =
1
rh
· ((x j− xi)( f j cosθ j− fi cosθ1)+(y j− yi)( f j sinθ j− fi sinθi))
h˙ = z˙ j− z˙i
h = z j− zi
hi = zi
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where the subscripts i and j indicate own and intruding aircraft, respectively. We
then add zero-mean Gaussian noise9 to the variables to emulate sensor noise.
3.5.3 CPD of TCAS RA Ti
Recall from Section 3.2.3 that we use mini TCAS to emulate the full TCAS logic.
The major assumptions of mini TCAS are:
1. All aircraft are TCAS-equipped and coordinate RAs.
2. Actual horizontal range rate is used10.
3. No tracking or encounter monitoring over time is performed. Hence, mini TCAS
is a memory-less system.
4. No TCAS strengthenings or reversals (updates or revisions to the initial TCAS).
5. The tau-rising test and horizontal miss distance test are not performed [16].
The implementation of mini TCAS in this work follows closely that described in
[16]. First, the range, altitude, and altitude separation tests are performed for colli-
sion detection. If no potential collision is detected, no RA is issued. If a potential
collision is detected, the algorithm then continues to determine the sense (direction)
and strength of the RA. In the sense selection process, the algorithm determines
which direction (ascend, descend, or level-off) gives the greatest vertical miss dis-
tance. However, to account for TCAS coordination, a modification to the algorithm
is made. To avoid issuing conflicting RAs, intruders’ senses (up, level, or down) that
appear in received intent messages are first removed from the list of candidate senses
for own aircraft. The direction is chosen from the remaining choices. Strength se-
lection follows to choose the least disruptive RA that still achieves the minimum
safety distance.
It is known that pilots react differently to a revised (second) RA than the initial
one. Especially in cases of the RAs contradicting one another, the pilots may expe-
rience cognitive dissonance, and even go into a confused mental state. As a result,
to model this phenomenon properly would require a whole new level of pilot mod-
eling, with perhaps separate models for the first and second RAs. One possible hack
is to use the same model for both RAs. However, doing so would yield misleading
results, since the pilot would experience no “mental conflict” to go against the pre-
vious RA, and thus is much more likely to comply to any RA change. Alternatively,
social welfare F could be hacked to demerit reversals or strenghtenings to RAs. For
now though, we discard any encounters that issue reversals or strenghtenings.
9 We assume independent noise for each variable rh, r˙h, h˙,h,hi with standard deviations of
100,50,4,10,10, respectively. These variables are described in Table 2.
10 In [16], the horizontal range rate is fixed to -500 ft/s.
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3.5.4 CPD of Pilot’s Observation Wi and Outcome H
We model the pilot’s observation Wi as being S corrupted with additive zero-mean
Gaussian noise11. The outcome H is calculated using the world state S, the pilot
actions A1,A2, and the aircraft kinematics described in Section 3.7.4.
3.6 Computing Level-K d-Relaxed Strategies
Using the semi net-form game (G,X ,u,R,pi) specified previously, this section de-
scribes the application of a modified version of Definition 7 to calculate player i’s
strategies. Table 3 specifies the additional parameters needed by the algorithm. To
be realistic, these model parameters should be learned from real data. However,
for now, they are chosen by hand. For convenience, we define the new variable
WTi′ , where i′ is a dummy player index, to be the combination of the nodes Wi′ ,
WTCASi′ , and Ti′ . Let v be the node controlled by player i. Then, applying Defini-
tion 4, we see that v = Ai, pa(v) = {Wi,Ti}, Sv = {H}, S−v = {S,WTi,WT−i,A−i},
and Y = {S,WTCASi ,WT−i,A−i}.
Table 3 Specification of parameters in unnormalized likelihood-weighted level-K d-relaxed strate-
gies (Definition 7) for the collision avoidance problem.
Parameter Value Description
K 2 Player level for all pilots
M 5 Number of samples of pilot’s own movespace
M′ 10 Number of samples of the pilot’s environment
λ (Ai | wi, ti) Uniform over movespace Satisficing distribution of player i
Λ 0(Ai | wi, ti) Wide Gaussian (σ = 20)
about RA
Level 0 distribution of player i
We proceed following the steps of Definition 7. In step 1, we form a set
{a′i( j) : j = 1, . . . ,M} by IID sampling λ (Ai | wi, ti) M times. Since the space of
Ai is continuous, we do not need to worry about removing duplicates.
The application of step 2 requires a slight modification. Recall that TCAS logic
is deterministic, causing its probability P˜K(ti | w′TCASi) where ti is the observed real-
ization of Ti, to be either 1 or 0. This creates a natural filtering effect that zeroes out
entire posterior probabilities in the sum according to whether the scenarios cause
the observed (evidence) RA to occur. In fact, since the space of the world state S is
so large, we found the number of unusable samples to be impractically high. This
rendered the straightforward application of Definition 7 infeasible.
11 We assume independent noise for each variable x,y,z,θ , θ˙ , z˙, f with standard deviations of
100,100,20,0.05,0,5,10, respectively. These variables are described in Table 1.
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To help direct the samples toward the relevant subspace, we introduce impor-
tance sampling to propose nodes S and WTCASi using their values sampled at the
top-level s and wTCASi respectively. Note that the player does not have access to
wTCASi or s – rather the simulator does. We use these variables to form the proposal
distribution for approximating the expectation. More concretely, we form a set of
weight-sample pairs {(w′(k),x′S−v(k)) : k = 1, . . .M′} by setting w′i = wi and t ′i = ti,
and instead of sampling from P˜K(XY ) =∏v′∈Y P˜K(Xv′ | Xpa(v′)) as described in step
2 of Definition 7, we IID sample from:
Q(XY ) = ∏
v′∈Y\{S,WTCASi}
P˜K(Xv′ | Xpa(v′))Q(S | s)Q(WTCASi | wTCASi)
and adjust the weighting factor accordingly by multiplying w′(k) by:
P˜K(s′(k))
Q(s′(k) | s)
P˜K(w′TCASi(k) | s′(k))
Q(w′TCASi(k) | wTCASi)
One can verify that this manipulation does not change the expected value [25]. Re-
call that S is composed of two parts: one that contains the kinematic states of the
aircraft, and the other that represents the TCAS intent messages. We denote these
variables as SK and SI , respectively, and choose to propose them separately, i.e.,
Q(S | s) = Q(SK | sK)Q(SI | sI). We choose Q(SK | sK) to be a tight Gaussian dis-
tribution12 centered about sK , and choose Q(SI | sI) to be a delta function about the
true value sI with probability q, or one of the following 4 values each with probabil-
ity 14 (1−q):
1. No intent received.
2. Intent received with an up sense.
3. Intent received with a level-off sense.
4. Intent received with a down sense.
We choose Q(WTCASi | wTCASi) to be a tight Gaussian distribution13 centered about
wTCASi .
The trick, as always with importance sampling Monte Carlo, is to choose a pro-
posal distribution that will result in low variance, and that is nonzero at all values
where the integrand is nonzero [25]. In this case, so long as the proposal distribu-
tion over s′ has full support, the second condition is met. So the remaining issue is
how much variance there will be. Since Q(WTCASi | wTCASi) is a tight Gaussian by
the choice of proposal distribution, values of w′TCASi will be very close to values of
wTCASi , causing P(ti | w′TCASi) to be much more likely to equal 1 than 0. To reduce
the variance even further, rather than form M′ samples of the distribution, samples
of the proposal distribution are generated until M′ of them have nonzero posterior.
12 We assume independent noise for each variable x,y,z,θ , θ˙ , z˙, f with standard deviations of
5,5,2,0.01,0,1,5, respectively. These variables are described in Table 1.
13 We assume independent noise for each variable rh, r˙h, h˙,h,hi with standard deviations of
5,2,2,2,2, respectively. These variables are described in Table 2.
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We continue at step 3. For each candidate action a′i( j), we estimate its expected
utility by sampling the outcome H from P˜K(H | x′Y (;),a′i( j),wi, ti), and computing
the estimate u˜Ki . The weighting factor compensates for our use of a proposal distribu-
tion to sample variables rather than sampling them from their natural distributions.
Finally, in step 4, we choose the move a′i( j∗) that has the highest expected utility
estimate.
3.7 Encounter Simulation
Up until now, we have presented a game which describes a particular instant t in
time. In order to simulate an encounter to any degree of realism, we must consider
how this game evolves with time.
3.7.1 Time Extension of the Bayes Net
Note that the timing of decisions14 is in reality stochastic as well as asynchronous.
However, to consider a stochastic and asynchronous timing model would greatly
increase the model’s complexity. For example, the pilot would need to average over
the other pilots’ decision timing and vice versa. As a first step, we choose a much
simpler timing model and make several simplifying assumptions. First, each pilot
only gets to choose a single move, and he does so when he receives his initial RA.
This move is maintained for the remainder of the encounter. Secondly, each pilot
decides his move by playing a simultaneous move game with the other pilots (the
game described by (G,X ,u,R,pi)). These assumptions effectively remove the timing
stochasticity from the model.
The choice of modeling as a simultaneous move game is an approximation, as
it precludes the possibility of the player anticipating the timing of players’ moves.
Formally speaking, this would introduce an extra dimension in the level-K thinking,
where the player would need to sample not only players’ moves, but also the timing
of such a move for all time in the past and future. However, it is noted that since
the players are not able to observe each other’s move directly (due to delays in
pilot and aircraft response), it does not make a difference to him whether it was
made in the past or simultaneously. This makes it reasonable to model the game
as simultaneous move at the time of decision. The subtlety here is that the player’s
thinking should account for when his opponent made his move via imagining what
his opponent would have seen at the time of decision. However, in this case, since
our time horizons are short, this is a reasonable approximation.
Figure 5 shows a revised Bayes net diagram – this time showing the extension
to multiple time steps. Quantities indicated by hatching in the figure are passed
14 We are referring to the time at which the player makes his decision, not the amount of time it
takes for him to decide. Recall that level-K reasoning occurs only in the mind of the decision-maker
and thus does not require any wall clock time.
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between time steps. There are two types of variables to be passed. First, we have the
aircraft states. Second, recall that TCAS intents are broadcasted to other aircraft as
a coordination mechanism. These intents must also be passed on to influence future
RAs.
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Fig. 5 Time-extended Bayes net diagram of a 2-aircraft mid-air encounter: We use a simple timing
model that allows each pilot to make a single move at the time he receives his TCAS alert.
3.7.2 Simulation Flow Control
Using the time-extended Bayes net as the basis for an inner loop, we add flow control
to manage the simulation. Figure 6 shows a flow diagram for the simulation of a
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single encounter. An encounter begins by randomly initializing a world state from
the encounter generator (to be discussed in Section 3.7.3). From here, the main loop
begins.
First, the observational (Wi and WTCASi ) and TCAS (Ti) nodes are sampled. If a
new RA is issued, the pilot receiving the new RA is allowed to choose a new move
via a modified level-K d-relaxed strategy (described in Section 3.6). Otherwise, the
pilots maintain their current path. Note that in our model, a pilot may only make a
move when he receives a new RA. Since TCAS strengthenings and reversals (i.e.,
updates or revisions to the initial RA) are not modeled, this implies that each pilot
makes a maximum of one move per encounter. Given the world state and pilot com-
mands, the aircraft states are simulated forward one time step, and social welfare
(to be discussed in Section 3.8) is calculated. If a near mid-air collision (NMAC)
is detected (defined as having two aircraft separated less than 100 ft vertically and
500 ft horizontally) then the encounter ends in collision and a social welfare value
of zero is assigned. If an NMAC did not occur, successful resolution conditions (all
aircraft have successfully passed each other) are checked. On successful resolution,
the encounter ends without collision and the minimum approach distance dmin is
returned. If neither of the end conditions are met, the encounter continues at the top
of the loop by sampling observational and TCAS nodes at the following time step.
3.7.3 Encounter Generation
The purpose of the encounter generator is to randomly initialize the world states
in a manner that is genuinely representative of reality. For example, the encounters
generated should be of realistic encounter geometries and configurations. One way
to approach this would be to use real data, and moreover, devise a method to gener-
ate fictitious encounters based on learning from real ones, such as that described in
[14, 15]. For now, the random geometric initialization described in [17] Section 6.1
is used15.
3.7.4 Aircraft Kinematics Model
Since aircraft kinematic simulation is performed at the innermost step, its implemen-
tation has an utmost impact on the overall system performance. To address compu-
tational considerations, a simplified aircraft kinematics model is used in place of full
aircraft dynamics. We justify these first-order kinematics in 2 ways: First, we note
that high-frequency modes are unlikely to have a high impact at the time scales (∼ 1
min.) that we are dealing with in this modeling. Secondly, modern flight control
systems operating on most (especially commercial) aircraft provide a fair amount of
damping of high-frequency modes as well as provide a high degree of abstraction.
We make the following assumptions in our model:
15 The one modification is that ttarget (the initial time to collision between aircraft) is generated
randomly from a uniform distribution between 40 s and 60 s rather than fixed at 40 s.
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Fig. 6 Flow diagram of the encounter simulation process: We initialize the encounter using an
encounter generator, and simulate forward in time using pilot commands and aircraft kinematics.
The encounter ends when the aircraft have either collided or have successfully passed each other.
1. Only kinematics are modeled. Aerodynamics are not modeled. The assumption
is that modern flight control systems abstract this from the pilot.
2. No wind. Wind is not considered in this model.
3. No sideslip. This model assumes that the aircraft velocity vector is always fully-
aligned with its heading.
4. Pitch angle is abstracted. Pitch angle is ignored. Instead, the pilot directly con-
trols vertical rate.
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5. Roll angle is abstracted. Roll angle is ignored. Instead, the pilot directly controls
heading rate.
Figure 7 shows the functional diagram of the kinematics model. The input com-
mands are first applied as inputs to first-order linear filters to update θ˙ , z˙, and f ,
these quantities are then used in the kinematic calculations to update the position
and heading of the aircraft at the next time step. Intuitively, the filters provide the
appropriate time response (transient) characteristics for the system, while the kine-
matic calculations approximate the effects of the input commands on the aircraft’s
position and heading.
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Fig. 7 Aircraft kinematics model functional diagram: Pilot commands are passed to filters to model
aircraft transient response to first order. Then aircraft kinematic equations based on forward Euler
integration are applied.
The kinematic update equations, based on forward Euler integration method, are
given by:
θt+∆ t = θt +∆ t · θ˙t
xt+∆ t = xt +∆ t · ft · cosθt
yt+∆ t = yt +∆ t · ft · sinθt
zt+∆ t = zt +∆ t · z˙t
Recall that a first-order filter requires two parameters: an initial value and a time
constant. We set the filter’s initial value to the pilot commands at the start of the
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encounter, thus starting the filter at steady-state. The filter time constants are chosen
by hand (using the best judgment of the designers) to approximate the behavior of
mid-size commercial jets. Refinement of these parameters is the subject of future
work.
3.7.5 Modeling Details Regarding the Pilot’s Move Ai
Recall that a pilot only gets to make a move when he receives a new RA. In fact,
since strenghtenings and reversals are not modeled, the pilot will begin the sce-
nario with a vertical speed, and get at most one chance to change it. At his decision
point, the pilots engage in a simultaneous move game (described in Section 3.6) to
choose an aircraft escape maneuver. To model pilot reaction time, a 5-second de-
lay is inserted between the time the player chooses his move, and when the aircraft
maneuver is actually performed.
3.8 Social Welfare F
Social welfare function is a function specified a-priori that maps an instantiation of
the Bayes net variables to a real number F . As a player’s degree of happiness is
summarized by his utility, social welfare is used to quantify the degree of happiness
for the system as a whole. Consequently, this is the system-level metric that the
system designer or operator seeks to maximize. As there are no restrictions on how
to set the social utility function, it is up to the system designer to decide the system
objectives. In practice, regulatory bodies, such as Federal Aviation Administration,
or International Civil Aviation Organization, will likely be interested in defining the
social welfare function in terms of a balance of safety and performance metrics. For
now, social welfare is chosen to be the minimum approach distance dmin. In other
words, the system is interested in aircraft separation.
3.9 Example Encounter
To look at average behavior, one would execute a large number of encounters to
collect statistics on F . To gain a deeper understanding of encounters, however, we
examine encounters individually. Figure 8 shows 10 samples of the outcome distri-
bution for an example encounter. Obviously, only a single outcome occurs in reality,
but the trajectory spreads provide an insightful visualization of the distribution of
outcomes. In this example, we can see (by visual inspection) that a mid-air collision
is unlikely to occur in this encounter. Furthermore, we see that probabilistic pre-
dictions by semi net-form game modeling provide a much more informative picture
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than the deterministic predicted trajectory that the TCAS model assumes (shown by
the thicker trajectory).
Fig. 8 Predicted trajectories sampled from the outcome distribution of an example encounter: Each
aircraft proceeds on a straight-line trajectory until the pilot receives an RA. At that point, the pilot
uses level-K d-relaxed strategies to decide what vertical rate to execute. The resultant trajectories
from 10 samples of the vertical rate are shown. The trajectory assumed by TCAS is shown as the
thicker trajectory.
3.10 Sensitivity Analysis
Because of its sampling nature, level-K relaxed strategy and its variants are all well-
suited for use with Monte Carlo techniques. In particular, such techniques can be
used to assess performance of the overall system by measuring social welfare F (as
defined in Section 3.8). Observing how F changes while varying parameters of the
system can provide invaluable insights about a system. To demonstrate the power of
this capability, parameter studies were performed on the mid-air encounter model,
and sample results are shown in Figures 9-12. In each case, we observe expected
social welfare while selected parameters are varied. Each datapoint represents the
average of 1800 encounters.
In Figure 9, the parameters Mw and MWTCAS , which are multiples on the noise
standard deviations of W and WTCAS respectively, are plotted versus social welfare
F . It can be seen that as the pilot and TCAS system’s observations get noisier (e.g.
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due to fog or faulty sensors), social welfare decreases. This agrees with our intuition.
A noteworthy observation is that social welfare decreases faster with Mw (i.e., when
the pilot has a poor visual observation of his environment) than with MWTCAS (i.e.,
noisy TCAS sensors). This would be especially relevant to, for example, a funder
who is allocating resources for developing less noisy TCAS sensors versus more
advanced panel displays for better situational awareness.
Fig. 9 Impacts of observational noise on social welfare: Social welfare is plotted against multiples
on the noise standard deviations of W and WTCAS. We observe that social welfare decreases much
faster with increase in MW than with increase in MWTCAS . This means that according to our model,
pilots receive more information from their general observations of the world state than from the
TCAS RA.
Figure 10 shows the dependence of social welfare on selected TCAS internal
logic parameters DMOD and ZTHR [16]. These parameters are primarily used to
define the size of safety buffers around the aircraft, and thus it makes intuitive sense
to observe an increase in F (in the manner that we’ve defined it) as these parameters
are increased. Semi net-form game modeling gives full quantitative predictions in
terms of a social welfare metric.
Figure 11 plots player utility weights versus social welfare. In general, the results
agree with intuition that higher α1 (stronger desire to avoid collision) and lower
α2 (weaker desire to stay on course) lead to higher social welfare. These results
may be useful in quantifying the potential benefits of training programs, regulations,
incentives, and other pilot behavior-shaping efforts.
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Fig. 10 Impacts of TCAS parameters DMOD and ZTHR on social welfare: We observe that social
welfare increases as DMOD and ZTHR are increased. This agrees with our intuition since these
parameters are used to define the size of safety buffers around the aircraft.
Fig. 11 Impacts of player utility weights (see Section 3.3) on social welfare: We observe that
higher α1 (more weight to avoiding collision) and lower α2 (less weight to maintaining current
course) leads to higher social welfare.
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Figure 12 plots model parameters M and M′ versus F . Recall from our discussion
in Section 2.6 that these parameters can be interpreted as a measure of the pilot’s
rationality. As such, we point out that these parameters are not ones that can be
controlled, but rather ones that should be set as closely as possible to reflect reality.
One way to estimate the “true” M and M′ would be to learn them from real data.
(Learning model parameters is the subject of a parallel research project.) A plot like
Figure 12 allows a quick assessment of the sensitivity of F to M and M′.
Fig. 12 Impacts of pilot model parameters M and M′ (see Definition 7) on social welfare: We
observe that as these parameters are increased, there is an increase in social welfare. This agrees
with our interpretation of M and M′ as measures of rationality.
3.11 Potential Benefits of a Horizontal RA System
Recall that due to high noise in TCAS’ horizontal sensors, the current TCAS system
issues only vertical RAs. In this section, we consider the potential benefits of a
horizontal RA system. The goal of this work is not to propose a horizontal TCAS
system design, but to demonstrate how semi net-form games can be used to evaluate
new technologies.
In order to accomplish this, we make a few assumptions. Without loss of gen-
erality, we refer to the first aircraft to issue an RA as aircraft 1, and the second
aircraft to issue an RA as aircraft 2. First, we notice that the variable WTCASi does
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not contain relative heading information, which is crucial to properly discriminat-
ing between various horizontal geometric configurations. In [18], Kochenderfer et
al. demonstrated that it is possible to track existing variables (range, range rate,
bearing to intruder, etc.) over time using an unscented Kalman filter to estimate rel-
ative heading and velocity of two aircraft. Furthermore, estimates of the steady-state
tracking variances for these horizontal variables were provided. For simplicity, this
work does not attempt to reproduce these results, but instead simply assumes that
these variables exist and are available to the system.
Secondly, until now the pilots have been restricted to making only vertical ma-
neuvers. This restriction is now removed, allowing pilots to choose moves that have
both horizontal and vertical components. However, we continue to assume enroute
aircraft, and thus aircraft heading rates are initialized to zero at the start of the en-
counter. Finally, we assume that the horizontal RA system is an augmentation to
the existing TCAS system rather than a replacement. As a result, we first choose
the vertical component using mini TCAS as was done previously, then select the
horizontal RA component using a separate process.
As a first step, we consider a reduced problem where we optimize the horizontal
RA for aircraft 2 only; aircraft 1 is always issued a maintain heading horizontal
RA. (Considering the full problem would require backward induction, which we do
not tackle at this time.) For the game theoretic reasoning to be consistent, we make
the assumption that the RA issuing order is known to not only the TCAS systems,
but also the pilots. Presumably, the pilots would receive this order information via
their intrument displays. To optimize the RA horizontal component for aircraft 2, we
perform an exhaustive search over each of the five candidate horizontal RAs (hard
left, moderate left, maintain heading, moderate right, and hard right) to determine its
expected social welfare. The horizontal RA with the highest expected social welfare
is selected and issued to the pilot. To compute expected social welfare, we simulate
a number of counterfactual scenarios of the remainder of the encounter, and then
average over them.
To evaluate its performance, we compare the method described above (using ex-
haustive search) to a system that issues a ‘maintain heading’ RA to both aircraft.
Figure 13 shows the distribution of social welfare for each system. Not only does
the exhaustive search method show a higher expected value of social welfare, it also
displays an overall distribution shift, which is highly desirable. By considering the
full shape of the distribution rather than just its expected value, we gain much more
insight into the behavior of the underlying system.
4 Advantages of Semi Net-Form Game Modeling
There are many distinct benefits to using semi net-form game modeling. We elabo-
rate in the following section.
1. Fully probabilistic. Semi net-form game is a thoroughly probabilistic model,
and thus represents all quantities in the system using random variables. As a re-
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Fig. 13 A comparison of social welfare for two different horizontal RA systems: Not only does the
expected value of social welfare increase by using the exhaustive search method, we also observe
a shift upwards in the entire probability distribution.
sult, not only are the probability distributions available for states of the Bayes
net, they are also available for any metrics derived from those states. For the
system designer, the probabilities offer an additional dimension of insight for
design. For regulatory bodies, the notion of considering full probability distri-
butions to set regulations represents a paradigm shift from the current mode of
aviation operation.
2. Modularity. A huge strength to using a Bayes net as the basis of modeling is
that it decomposes a large joint probability into smaller ones using conditional
independence. In particular, these smaller pieces have well-defined inputs and
outputs, making them easily upgraded or replaced without affecting the entire
net. One can imagine an ongoing modeling process that starts by using very
crude models at the beginning, then progressively refining each component into
higher fidelity ones. The interaction between components is facilitated by using
the common language of probability.
3. Computational human behavior model. Human-In-The-Loop (HITL) experi-
ments (those that involve human pilots in mid- to high-fidelity simulation envi-
ronments) are very tedious and expensive to perform because they involve care-
fully crafted test scenarios and human participants. For the above reasons, HITL
experiments produce very few data points relative to the number needed for sta-
tistical significance. On the other hand, semi net-form games rely on mathemati-
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cal modeling and numerical computations, and thus produce data at much lower
cost.
4. Computational convenience. Because semi net-form game algorithms are based
on sampling, they enjoy many inherent advantages. First, Monte Carlo algorithms
are easily parallelized to multiple processors, making them highly scalable and
powerful. Secondly, we can improve the performance of our algorithms by using
more sophisticated Monte Carlo techniques.
5 Conclusions and Future Work
In this chapter, we defined a framework called “Semi Network-Form Games,” and
showed how to apply that framework to predict pilot behavior in NMACs. As we
have seen, such a predictive model of human behavior enables not only powerful
analyses but also design optimization. Moreover, that method has many desirable
features which include modularity, fully-probabilistic modeling capabilities, and
computational convenience.
The authors caution that since this study was performed using simplified models
as well as uncalibrated parameters, that further studies be pursued to verify these
findings. The authors point out that the primary focus of this work is to demonstrate
the modeling technology, and thus a follow-on study is recommended to refine the
model using experimental data.
In future work, we plan to further develop the ideas in semi network-form games
in the following ways. First, we will explore the use of alternative numerical tech-
niques for calculating the conditional distribution describing a player’s strategy
P(Xv | xpa(v)), such as using variational calculations and belief propagation [19].
Secondly, we wish to investigate how to learn semi net-form game model param-
eters from real data. Lastly, we will develop a software library to facilitate semi
net-form game modeling, analysis and design. The goal is to create a comprehen-
sive tool that not only enables easy representation of any hybrid system using a
semi net-form game, but also houses ready-to-use algorithms for performing learn-
ing, analysis and design on those representations. We hope that such a tool would
be useful in augmenting the current verification and validation process of hybrid
systems in aviation.
By building powerful models such as semi net-form games, we hope to augment
the current qualitative methods (i.e., expert opinion, expensive HITL experiments)
with computational human models to improve safety and performance for all hybrid
systems.
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